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Intra-regional spillovers from Nigeria and South Africa to the rest of 
Africa: New evidence from a FAVAR model 
 
Abstract: This paper examines the effects of intraregional spillovers propagated by Nigeria and South 
Africa on real economic activities and interest rates movement in three African regional blocs (i.e., 
ECOWAS, SADC and CEMAC) employing the factor augmented VAR (FAVAR) modelling approach 
over the period 1980Q2–2015Q1. Moreover, a counterfactual analysis, based on the same modelling 
approach,  is conducted to assess what would happen to the real activities and monetary policy indicators 
of the three regional blocs in the absence of real and monetary shocks from the two countries. The paper 
finds that while the influence of Nigeria is limited to ECOWAS, South Africa plays an influential role 
on the real sectors and financial systems of all the regional blocs, albeit with short-lived impacts on 
ECOWAS and CEMAC. Moreover, the results of the counterfactual analysis show that real and 
financial activities in the SADC regions are highly influenced by South Africa. Our result suggests that 
countries with proper coordination of macroeconomic and monetary policies as well as organised 
financial market should be the sources of contagion and spillover, mostly at regional level.   
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1. Introduction 
 
In the last two decades, Africa has increasingly integrated into the world economy through trade 
and financial linkages with trade playing a greater role (see, e.g. Samake and Yang, 2014; Gurara and 
Ncube, 2013; Kose and Riezman, 2001). This development has inevitably exposed the continent to 
external shocks as the ongoing globalisation process increases. Over the years, few resource-rich 
countries have evolved into frontier markets becoming attractive destinations of private foreign capital 
inflows (donor funding and foreign direct investment), exposing the continent to external financial 
shocks. These shocks are then propagated quickly in the region through large economies such as Nigeria 
and South Africa (SA). These two large African countries have extensive trade and financial ties with 
many African countries and in most instances sources of contagion in the region (see, e.g., World Bank, 
2016; IMF, 2012). In particular,  Nigeria’s increasing integration into the world economy via trade and 
financial links as well as its position as the largest oil exporter (and producer) in the SSA region makes 
the country a prime candidate for potential sources of intra-regional  (or inward) spillover into the region 
(see, e.g., Arizala, et al. 2018; Giovannetti and Velucchi, 2013).  
Premised on the business cycle theory, an increase in bilateral trade between Nigeria, South 
Africa and other African countries (in particular, members of the same regional blocs) that deepens 
regional integration would enhance the transmission of regional real or financial shocks and business 
cycle co-movements (Frankel and Rose, 1997, 1998; Kose and Yi, 2006)1.   
 Empirical literature is replete with  studies that mainly focus on the implications of global 
(external) shocks on African countries (see, e.g., Mwase et al.2016; Rasaki and Malikane, 2016; 
Biljanovska and Meyer-Cirkel, 2016; Dabla-Norris et al.2015; Carnales-Kriljenko et al.2014; 
Drummond and Ramirez, 2009;  Raddatz, 2008; Ndulu and O’Connell, 2007)2. However, the intra-
                                                          
1
 The underlying intuition is simple: existence of extensive trade link allows the transmission of shocks from one 
country to another. Subsequent studies have provided empirical support for this observation (see, e.g., Baxter and 
Kouparitsas, 2005; Inklaar et al. 2007). For evidence on African countries, see, e.g., Tabsoba (2007, 2010). 
2In these studies, sources of macroeconomic fluctuations in many Africa countries have been attributed to, inter 
alia, external (global) shocks linked to global demand export-driven shocks, terms of trade volatility, exchange 
rate movement, commodity price shocks, credit supply shocks (tight global financial conditions) and economic 
conditions of Africa’s major trading partners in both the advanced (e.g., G7 countries, the US, Euro area) and 
emerging markets (in particular, China) economies.  
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regional spillover effects from large economies, such as Nigeria or South Africa, which are regional 
drivers of growth, trade, investment as well as financial flows on regional economic blocs in Africa 
remains largely unstudied.  
 
Hitherto, only a few studies have considered the effects of intra-regional spillover effects on 
African countries (see Arora and Vamvakadis, 2005; Basedvant et al. 2015; Ariazala et al. 2019; 
Carnales-Kriljenko et al. 2013; IMF, 2012; World Bank, 2016). Nevertheless, most of these studies 
mainly focus on the implication of growth shocks from either Nigeria or South Africa on a few 
neighbouring countries with close geographical proximity, trade and financial ties. The findings in these 
studies are remain inconclusive possibly due to the small sample of countries studied and the employed 
econometric models that suffers from well-known drawbacks attributable to curse of dimensionality, 
over-parametrization and endogeneity issues.  In order to remedy these shortcomings, these paper 
provides the following contributions;  first, we consider the effects of intra-regional spillovers from 
prominently large resource-rich economies, in this case, Nigeria and South Africa on three regional 
blocs (i.e., CEMAC, ECOWAS and SADC) consisting of 26 sub-Saharan Africa countries, rather than 
specific (small sub-set of) countries. Second, in contrast to previous studies, we employ the  factor-
augmented vector autoregressive (FAVAR) model to accommodate the large dataset and avoid issues 
related to curse of dimensionality and endogeneity (see Bernanke et al., 2005). Hence, we circumvent 
the shortcomings in the previous studies and expect to produce more robust inferences. Thirdly, 
counterfactual analyses are conducted using the FAVAR model to assess what would have happened to 
the three regional blocs’ economic activities and interest rates in the absence of shocks from South 
Africa and Nigeria.  
Our work is important and timely given the renewed political efforts by policymakers in Africa to 
increase the total share of African global trade by deepening intra-regional trade, mainly through the 
establishment of large free trade areas such as the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) and African 
Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)(see, Tabsoba (2007, 2010).)3. Hence, the findings from our 
intra-regional growth ‘spillover analysis’ will shed more light on the important roles of large resource-
rich and regional hegemonic economies such as Nigeria and South Africa as growth drivers and hence 
sources of internal and regional economic shocks as well as macroeconomic fluctuations in the 
continent.   
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of related empirical 
studies. Section 3 briefly discusses the dominance of Nigeria and South Africa on intra-African trade 
from sub-regional perspective. Section 4 presents the FAVAR model for open economies with a broad 
set of selected variables and specification of the model. Empirical results are reported and discussed in 
Section 5 while Section 6 concludes with summarized findings, some policy implications, and area for 
future research.   
 
2. A brief literature review 
 
A number of studies have investigated the role of large economic leaders such as Nigeria and 
South Africa as potential growth poles for economic development and regional integration in Africa 
given their growing trade and financial linkages across the continent.  For instance, using a panel 
regression model of 47 African countries, Arora and Vamvakidis (2005b) find a significant influence 
                                                          
3The AfCFTA is the largest FTA since the establishment of world trade organization (WTO) comprising of 54 
out of 55 African countries. The AfCFTA was formally ratified in 30th May 2019. While the TFTA agreement 
brings together three large RECs, namely: The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) and East African Community (EAC). The TFTA was signed 
in 10th of June 2015 in Egypt and ratified on 15th of July 2015 in the 25th AU Summit in Johannesburg. For more 
discussion on the AU’s objectives on the creation of these large FTAs, for example, deepen regional economic 
integration as well as stimulate business cycles convergence, see example, Cloete (2019), Arizala et al.(2018b) 
and  (IMF, 2019; UNCTAD, 2015) for the AfCFTA; ECA (2016) and Hartzenberg and Erasmus (2012) for the 
TFTA. 
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of South African growth shock on the rest of Africa, where one percentage point rise in South Africa’s 
economic growth increases economic growth in the rest of Africa by 0.5–0.75 percentage points.  
But, findings in more recent studies suggest negligible impacts of growth spillovers from South 
Africa on economic growth (outputs) of its neighbouring countries belonging to the same regional 
trading bloc or those with close trade and financial ties. Among these, Carnales-Kriljenko et al. (2013) 
employ a dynamic panel regression (augmented with General Method of Moments) covering the period 
1986-2010 to assess the effects of a positive South African real GDP shock on the economic growth of 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS and find an insignificant effect of economic 
expansion in South Africa on economic growth in the BLNS countries. While Basdevant et al. (2015) 
extend the work of Arora and Vamvakidis (2005b) by keeping the original 46 countries and applying a 
panel regression model over the period 1960 –2009 and find no effect of growth spillovers from South 
Africa to the rest of the African countries during the post-and-pre 1994 periods.   
The rebasing of the Nigerian gross domestic product (GDP) in 2013 that led to the former 
displacing South Africa as the largest economy in Africa has attracted the attention of academic 
researchers and policymakers keen on Nigeria’s new hegemonic role as a driver of intra-trade and 
financial linkages on the continent and in the West African region in particular.  
Based on this new development, IMF (2012) examined the effects of growth spillover from 
Nigeria on the neighbouring countries with close trade ties, namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Niger, and Togo, by estimating country-specific structural VAR (SVAR) 
models spanning the period 1990Q1–2011Q4, and obtained results showing negligible (and statistically 
insignificant) effect of positive growth spillovers from Nigeria on these West African countries. But, it 
is well-known that the results of SVAR models are in general sensitive to identification assumptions, 
and the number of shocks that can be simulated is limited. Relatedly, World Bank (2016) employs a 
Bayesian vector autoregression (BVAR) model consisting of Nigeria, South Africa, Botswana, Ghana 
and Uganda with data spanning 2007Q2-2015Q2, and find an insignificant influence of transmitted 
growth shocks from Nigeria and South Africa on economic activities of their neighbouring countries.  
Finally, Ariazala et al. (2019) employed a dynamic panel regression analysis of 45 sub-Saharan 
African (SSA) countries for the period 1980–2016 and find 1% shock to an intra-regional trading 
partners’ growth (weighted average) causes the output of other SSA countries to rise by between  0.2 
and 0.5%. These authors might have identified several channels for intra-regional spillovers, still, they 
do not examine the implications of intra-regional shocks emanating from regional forces like Nigeria 
and South Africa on intra-regional trade and cross-border investments in the SSA region.  
Evidently, although the panel regression analysis utilized in most of the surveyed existing studies 
may have accommodated large dataset, nonetheless, it is generally accepted that these large-scale 
macro-models are susceptible to curse of dimensionality problem, over-parametrization (i.e., the use of 
many lags adequately capture the effects of simulated shocks) causing significant loss of degrees of 
freedom and heterogeneity problems. These drawbacks tend to bias deduced inferences and drawn 
conclusions contradict economic theory on shock transmission via trade linkages.  
 
3. Nigeria and South Africa as Main Drivers of Regional Trade: 
In this section, we briefly discuss the influence of Nigeria and South Africa in the sub-Saharan 
African region and particularly in their respective regional blocs where the two countries have strong 
trade and financial ties. The motivation behind this analysis is informed by many factors. Firstly, trade 
has been found as the most important channel for cross-country growth spillovers in Africa (see, Dabla-
Norris et al.2015; Tapsoba, 2010; Kose and Riezmann, 2001) and intra-African trade remains a key 
driver of economic development and regional integration (see, Arizala, 2018a,b; Fofack, 2018).  
Notwithstanding, recent trade data from International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics 
(Fig.9 in the Appendix) shows that compared to other regions in the world, total intra-Africa trade (3%) 
is significantly low compared to that of other regions, for example, European Union (68%), Asia (59%), 
North America (37%) and Latin America (20%)4.   
                                                          
4See, Afreximbank (2018).  
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Similarly, intra-regional trade is dominated by a few countries (largely resource-rich). A closer 
look at the trade data presented in Tables 1 and 2 reveal that total African trade is concentrated to 11 
out of 54 African countries, with South Africa having the largest share (29%-32%), followed by Nigeria 
(6.5%-7.1%) between 2014 and 2017. The total shares of South Africa, Nigeria, Namibia (the top three 
countries) alone accounted for over 51.2% of total intra-SSA exports during the period under review. 
Same dominance pattern is apparent in recent years, for example, during 2016–2017 period, the total 
share of South Africa, Nigeria, Namibia and Botswana5, accounted for about 76.7%  and 79.4% 
respectively of total SSA exports. Evidently, South Africa accounts for a disproportionately larger share 
of total intra-African trade of about 30% to 32%. 
 
3.1. Trade linkages: Nigeria, South Africa and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) 
South Africa is the largest intra-Africa trader, followed by Nigeria which is the second largest source 
of regional (export) demand (Tables 1 and 2). Both economies are resource-rich with South Africa being 
a prominent source of non-fuel (precious metals) commodities, while Nigeria is a major supplier of 
crude oil. In addition, Nigeria and South Africa have significant bilateral trade with each other. Jointly, 
Nigeria and South Africa account for about 50% of Africa’s total GDP at 29.3% and 19.1% respectively. 
Between 2014 and 2017, South Africa accounted for about 25% of total intra-African trade (34% in 
exports and 15.1% in imports), while Nigeria accounted for 12% and 4% intra-Africa exports and 
imports respectively.  The rebasing of Nigeria’s gross domestic product (GDP)  from $270 billion to 
$510 billion in 2013 not only made it surpass  South Africa as the largest economy in Africa but also 
increased Nigeria’s share of total sub-Saharan African GDP from 21.3% to 31.7% (see, Sy, 2015; 
Reuters, 2014; The Economist, 2014).  
 
3.1.1. Linkages between Nigeria and the rest of the region.   
 
Furthermore, Nigeria is the largest oil exporter in the region. These features reinforce Nigeria’s 
important role as a regional economic hegemony (a key source of regional demand), prominent source 
market of crude oil and a potential source of intra-regional economic shocks.  The country belongs to 
two regional economic communities (RECs), namely the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS)6 and Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)7, where it accounts for about 75% 
and 37% total GDPs in the respective RECs.   
However, the contribution of Nigeria to intra-African trade has steadily declined since 2014 due 
to the decreasing global oil prices as oil exports comprise the largest share of Nigeria’s total exports. 
For example, in 2014, Nigeria contributed 9.2% (US$7.1 billion) of total intra-Africa trade before 
recording a declining share of 5.3% (US$6.5 billion) in 2016 and 5.5% (US$7.1 billion) in 2017 (Table 
1). Nevertheless, the country remains a key source of intra-regional demand accounting for about 83% 
to 88% of crude oil exports to other African countries, with almost half of the petroleum exports going 
to South Africa.  Nigeria’s other export products include floating structure for breaking up (3%), electric 
energy (2%) and petroleum gas (1%)8.   
Finally, looking at inter-regional trade, Nigeria generally accounts for the bulk of total intra-
ECOWAS trade9. For instance, between 2014 and2017, Nigeria accounted for about 45% and 18% of 
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 In 2017, Namibia (7.5%) displaced Botswana (4.7%) among the group of top three contributors in total intra-
African trade 
6
 ECOWAS currently has 15 member states (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo).  
7
 CEN-SAD currently has 24 member states (Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, 
Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo and Tunisia) aspiring to the establish an Economic Union 
which includes the free movement of goods, services and commodities 
8TRALAC(2019) 
9In this paper, we refer to intra-regional trade between Nigeria, South Africa and their regional blocs 
interchangeably as inter-regional trade.  
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total intra-ECOWAS export and imports respectively.  Specifically, out of the total intra-ECOWAS 
export and import of US$ 19.5 billion and US$ 8 billion in 2017, Nigeria’s export and import accounted 
for US$7.8 billion and US$1.5 billion respectively. In the SSA region, Nigeria is also a key export 
market for agricultural products (and manufacturing goods) from neighbouring countries such as 
Guinea-Bissau (6% of exports), Côte d’Ivoire (3% of exports), and Niger (2.8% of exports)10. 
2.1.2 Linkages between South Africa and the rest of the region 
South Africa (SA) accounts for about 21% of SSA’s GDP. The country is also a key export 
destination for neighbouring countries in the Southern region belonging to two regional blocs: Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) and Southern African Customs Union (SACU), however, 
the former is the largest export demand market for South Africa. Resultantly, South Africa accounts for 
about 61% of SADC regional GDP11, hence it is important a regional growth driver in the Southern 
African region. As a prominent export destination, South Africa’s largest exports demand (as a % of 
GDP) originates from Swaziland (25% of GDP), followed by Lesotho (10% of GDP), Mozambique 
(10% of GDP) and Zimbabwe (5% of GDP), in contrast, exports from these countries to South Africa 
is generally less than 5% of the GDP of exports of crude oil producers (resource-rich countries) in West 
Africa, for example, Nigeria and Ghana, over the past decade.   
Analysis of recent trade data on intra-regional trade affirms South Africa’s role as a key source 
of export demand in the SSA region (Table 2). At the regional level, South Africa accounted for about 
26.4% (US$41.2 billion) of total intra-Africa trade in 2014, which fell slightly to 24.2% (US$29.4 
billion) in 2016, before rising to about 24.9% (US$31.9 billion) in 2017.  South Africa mainly trades 
with its neighbouring countries. The country imports about 40%–50% of its crude oil (and energy) 
products mainly from Nigeria and Angola12. But, only approximately 10% of South Africa’s total 
imports are from Africa and they are mainly sourced from Nigeria (20.1%), Angola (15.7%), Swaziland 
(14.3%), Mozambique (10.5%), Namibia (9.8%) and rest of Africa (29.6%).  The top 10 products 
imported by South Africa from the rest of Africa accounts for 63% of its total intra-Africa imports, 
which mainly consists of crude petroleum oils (87% of which are imported from Nigeria and Angola), 
mixtures of odoriferous substances, semi-manufactured gold and petroleum gas13.  
In the SADC region, South Africa accounted for about 63% and 25% of total intra-SADC export 
and imports respectively and about  43% of total intra-SADC total trade between 2014 to 2017 (Table 
2). In monetary terms, out of the total inter-regional export and import of about US$ 35 billion and US$ 
32.9 billion in 2016, South Africa accounted for US$21.3 billion (about 33%) and US$8.1 billion (about 
14.1%) accordingly. Of the total intra-Africa trade in 2017, South Africa accounted for about 26% of 
exports and 10% of imports. South Africa’s exports are well diversified and comprise of petroleum oil 
(7%), vehicles and parts thereof (4%), electric energy (3%) and chromium ores (3%) to name a few 
(UNCTAD 2018). The main destination markets for South African exports in Africa are Botswana 
(16.5%), Namibia (15.34%), Mozambique (12.4%), Zambia (9.7%), Zimbabwe (8.9%) and others 
(37.1%).   
Deductively, plausible evidence from the foregoing analysis is that a slowdown or expansion in 
economic activity in either Nigeria or South Africa would weaken or strengthen economic activities in 
these countries respective regional blocs due to these countries’ relatively larger GDPs and 
disproportionately larger share of regional trade. However, the implications of transmitted intra-
regional spillovers (or shocks) from the two largest African countries on their respective regional 
trading blocs remain an empirical issue that needs further examination. 
                                                          
10
. The ratification of the ECOWAS common external tariff, which became effective in January 2015 is expected 
to boost sub-regional trade, also in countries belonging to the Nigeria–WAEMU (West African Economic and 
Monetary Union) bilateral trade (World Bank, 2016).  
11
 See, Carnales-Kriljenko et al. (2013). South Africa represent between 4% and 11% of SADC’s total GDP. 
12
 See, Afreximbank (2017, 2018) 
13
 Trade data from UNCTAD (2019) shows that SA’s main intra-Africa export products are broad-based and 
includes: petroleum oils, goods and passenger motor vehicles, electrical energy, chromium ores consumer goods, 
construction materials, agricultural inputs, food and coal.  
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Table 1: Intra-ECOWAS trade (US$ billion unless otherwise indicated), 2014-2017. 
  Intra-African Exports  
Country share of total intra-
African exports (%) Intra-African Imports  
Country share of total intra-
African imports (%)  Total Intra-African trade 
Country share of total intra-
African trade (%)  
Country  2014 2015 2016 2017 2014 2015 2016 2017 2014 2015 2016 2017 2014 2015 2016 2017 2014 2015 2016 2017 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Angola 2.07 1.41 1.28 1.33 2.64 1.97 2.00 1.98 1.48 1.23 0.96 0.98 1.90 1.88 1.68 1.61 3.55 2.64 2.25 2.31 2.27 1.93 1.85 1.80 
Benin 0.38 0.16 0.10 0.15 0.49 0.23 0.16 0.22 0.66 0.48 0.45 0.44 0.85 0.73 0.79 0.71 1.04 0.64 0.56 0.58 0.67 0.47 0.46 0.45 
Burkina Faso 0.12 0.35 0.34 0.73 0.15 0.49 0.54 1.09 1.28 0.74 0.87 1.28 1.65 1.13 1.52 2.10 1.40 1.09 1.21 2.01 0.90 0.80 1.00 1.57 
Cote d'Ivoire 4.24 3.30 2.82 3.27 5.41 4.62 4.39 4.87 3.25 2.19 1.79 2.04 4.19 3.35 3.12 3.35 7.49 5.49 4.61 5.31 4.80 4.01 3.79 4.14 
Gambia 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.15 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.20 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.11 
Ghana 1.33 1.86 1.73 1.80 1.70 2.61 2.70 2.68 3.65 0.86 0.86 1.00 4.70 1.31 1.50 1.63 4.98 2.72 2.60 2.80 3.19 1.99 2.14 2.18 
Guinea 0.03 0.43 0.33 0.53 0.04 0.60 0.51 0.79 0.37 0.85 0.88 0.88 0.48 1.30 1.53 1.44 0.40 1.28 1.21 1.41 0.26 0.94 0.99 1.10 
Niger 0.23 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.29 0.26 0.29 0.27 0.55 0.38 0.32 0.33 0.71 0.59 0.56 0.55 0.78 0.57 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.42 0.42 0.40 
Nigeria 11.58 7.34 5.01 5.62 14.78 10.28 7.82 8.37 2.83 1.71 1.51 1.45 3.64 2.61 2.62 2.37 14.41 9.05 6.51 7.07 9.24 6.61 5.36 5.51 
Sierra Leone 0.03 0.03 0.17 0.21 0.04 0.04 0.27 0.32 0.17 0.53 0.12 0.16 0.22 0.80 0.21 0.27 0.20 0.55 0.30 0.37 0.13 0.40 0.24 0.29 
Togo 0.82 0.44 0.50 0.51 1.05 0.62 0.78 0.77 0.43 0.30 0.23 0.27 0.55 0.45 0.40 0.44 1.25 0.74 0.73 0.78 0.80 0.54 0.60 0.61 
Total  20.84 15.56 12.55 14.39 26.60 21.80 19.58 21.45 14.82 9.35 8.08 8.91 19.09 14.27 14.08 14.60 35.66 24.90 20.66 23.29 22.87 18.21 16.99 18.16 
 
 
Table 2. Intra-SADC trade (US$ billion unless otherwise indicated), 2014-2017.  
  Intra-African Exports  
Country share of total intra-
African exports (%) Intra-African Imports  
Country share of total intra-
African imports (%) Total Intra-African trade 
Country share of total intra-African 
trade (%) 
Country  2014 2015 2016 2017 2014 2015 2016 2017 2014 2015 2016 2017 2014 2015 2016 2017 2014 2015 2016 2017 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Angola 2.07 1.41 1.28 1.33 2.64 1.97 2.00 1.98 1.48 1.23 0.96 0.98 1.90 1.88 1.68 1.61 3.55 2.64 2.25 2.31 2.27 1.93 1.85 1.80 
Botswana 1.25 1.85 1.94 0.85 1.60 2.59 3.03 1.27 5.91 5.71 4.77 3.92 7.61 8.72 8.30 6.42 7.16 7.56 6.71 4.77 4.59 5.52 5.52 3.72 
Congo, DR 1.46 1.24 1.15 1.94 1.86 1.74 1.80 2.89 3.60 2.58 2.25 2.40 4.64 3.95 3.92 3.94 5.06 3.83 3.40 4.35 3.25 2.80 2.80 3.39 
Lesotho 0.02 0.34 0.37 0.39 0.03 0.48 0.58 0.58 0.01 1.05 1.03 1.20 0.01 1.60 1.79 1.97 0.03 1.39 1.40 1.60 0.02 1.01 1.15 1.24 
Malawi 0.28 0.37 0.43 0.51 0.36 0.51 0.68 0.76 1.83 0.77 0.78 0.88 1.07 1.18 1.36 1.44 1.11 1.14 1.22 1.39 0.71 0.83 1.00 1.08 
Mauritius 0.41 0.44 0.43 0.45 0.52 0.62 0.67 0.67 0.54 0.53 0.60 0.71 0.69 0.81 1.04 1.17 0.95 0.97 1.03 1.17 0.61 0.71 0.84 0.91 
Mozambique 1.24 0.79 0.89 1.16 1.58 1.11 1.39 1.73 3.72 2.66 1.75 2.39 4.79 4.06 3.05 3.92 4.96 3.45 2.64 3.55 3.18 2.52 2.17 2.77 
Namibia 4.33 2.54 2.02 3.36 5.53 3.56 3.15 5.00 5.19 5.53 4.68 4.19 6.68 8.45 8.16 6.86 9.52 8.07 6.70 7.55 6.10 5.90 5.52 5.89 
South Africa 27.52 23.55 21.30 23.35 35.13 33.01 33.24 34.77 13.72 9.54 8.09 8.57 17.67 14.57 14.09 14.03 41.24 33.09 29.39 31.92 26.44 24.19 24.19 24.89 
Swaziland 0.14 2.18 2.12 2.33 0.18 3.06 3.31 3.47 0.27 2.75 2.66 2.86 0.35 4.20 4.63 4.68 0.41 4.93 4.78 5.19 0.26 3.60 3.93 4.05 
Tanzania 0.85 2.29 1.65 1.51 1.09 3.21 2.57 2.24 1.35 0.97 0.95 0.56 1.74 1.48 1.65 0.92 2.20 3.26 2.60 2.07 1.41 2.39 2.14 1.61 
Zambia  0.77 1.70 1.43 1.59 2.73 2.38 2.23 2.36 5.85 4.86 4.39 5.12 7.53 7.43 7.65 8.38 2.76 6.56 5.82 6.71 1.77 4.80 4.79 5.23 
Total  40.34 38.70 35.01 38.77 53.25 54.24 54.65 57.72 43.47 38.18 32.91 33.78 54.68 58.33 57.32 55.34 78.95 76.89 67.94 72.58 50.61 56.20 55.90 56.58 
 
 
Table 3. Intra-CEMAC trade (US$ billion unless otherwise indicated), 2014-2017. 
  Intra-African Exports  
Country share of total intra-
African exports (%) Intra-African Imports  
Country share of total intra-
African imports (%) Total Intra-African trade 
Country share of total intra-
African trade (%) 
Country  2014 2015 2016 2017 2014 2015 2016 2017 2014 2015 2016 2017 2014 2015 2016 2017 2014 2015 2016 2017 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Cameroon 0.54 0.49 0.36 0.56 0.69 0.69 0.57 0.83 1.69 1.51 0.83 0.76 2.17 2.31 1.44 1.25 0.28 2.00 1.19 1.32 0.18 1.47 0.98 1.03 
Chad 0.03 0 0 0 0.04 0 0 0 0.21 0.21 0.16 0.17 0.27 0.32 0.28 0.29 0.24 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.14 
Congo, Rep  0.17 0.65 0.45 0.56 0.22 0.91 0.7 0.84 0.54 0.38 0.37 0.29 0.69 0.58 0.65 0.48 0.71 1.03 0.82 0.86 0.45 0.75 0.68 0.67 
Kenya 2.27 1.93 1.95 1.83 2.9 2.7 3.04 2.72 1.33 1.17 1.09 1.56 1.72 1.78 1.89 2.55 3.6 3.09 3.03 3.38 2.31 2.26 2.49 2.64 
Total 3.01 3.07 2.76 2.95 3.85 4.3 4.31 4.39 3.77 3.27 2.45 2.78 4.85 4.99 4.26 4.57 4.83 6.33 5.21 5.74 3.09 4.64 4.29 4.48 
Data sources for Tables 1, 2 & 3: Afreximbank (2017, 2018). Own estimations.  
Note: Exports and imports data may differ slightly because these trade data are quoted as FOB and CIF respectively.  
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4. The Econometric Model 
 
Given the objective of the paper to analyse the effects of specific shocks to Nigeria and South Africa 
on real activity and interest rate of selected African regional blocs, we follow Helbling et al (2011) by 
undertaking our empirical analysis in two steps. First, we estimate the common component of real 
activity and interest rate of each regional bloc by making use of the GDP and interest rates of each 
country within the specific regional bloc to obtain the regional factor. These regional factors are 
obtained by extracting the first principal component of each of these series. It is worth noting that 
alternative approaches could have been used, such as a full-fledged dynamic factor model (DFM). 
However, Helbling et al (2011) show that global or regional factors obtained with DFM are quite 
similar to those obtained from principal component analysis. Second, we consider how shocks 
emanating from Nigeria and South Africa affect real activity and interest rates in each of the African 
regional blocs by using a FAVAR (Factor-Augmented Vector Autoregressive) model. in fact, we 
construct two FAVAR models, for Nigeria and South Africa with each FAVAR containing South 
Africa or Nigerian specific variables and the common components of the three African regional blocs, 
such as  
 
 
 
f y
t t t tX F Y       
where f and y are N K and 1N  matrices of factor loadings, and t is a 1N   vector of weakly 
correlated idiosyncratic error terms with zero mean.  tX  are key policy variables from which impulse 
response functions are identified.  tF  are the common components in the three regional blocs and  tY  
are Nigerian or South African-specific variables.  
 
We identify the shocks by making use of a set of sign restriction as proposed by Uhlig (2005) in order 
to produce impulse responses that are consistent with prevailing structural and theoretical predictions. 
For example, we identify contractionary monetary policy in South Africa by assuming that they lead 
to the increase in interest rate in the SADC region as literature abounds on the direct influence of 
South Africa in the SADC region (see Bonga-Bonga and Mabe, forthcoming). We have conducted 
robustness check of our results to alternative identification restrictions and horizon assumptions. All 
of our main results are robust to these checks.  
 
We perform a number of counterfactual analyses whereby simulations are carried out during which 
structural shocks of interest rates and GDP for Nigeria and South Africa are set to zero over the 
relevant period. The simulation exercises aim at assessing what would happen to the real activity of 
SADC without GDP shocks from the South African economy, for example. The counterfactual 
analyses are conducted based on historical decomposition of structural shocks 
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5. Data, Empirical Results and Discussion 
5.1 Data 
 
We use quarterly data from 1980Q2 to 2015Q114, which coincides with the proliferation of 
regional FTAs and the creation of common currency areas among Africa countries. These regional 
integration efforts were aimed at fostering stronger intra-regional economic linkages and engendering 
business cycle convergences to reduce the adverse impact of external shocks. Our dataset consist of 412 
time-series covering the real, nominal and financial sectors for the 26 African countries belonging to 
three blocs: CEMAC (Cameroon, Chad, the Republic of Congo and Kenya15 ECOWAS (Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Niger, Sierra Leone and Togo) and SADC (Angola, 
Botswana, Congo DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania 
and Zambia).  
On aggregate, our sample size covers approximately 70% of African GDP as measured by 
purchasing power parity (Table 5 in the Appendix)16. Moreover, our country sample size is diverse and 
suitable for intra-regional spillover analysis in three ways. Firstly, it comprises of middle-income, low-
income and fragile economies, which are also major oil exporters and non-oil exporters (i.e., precious 
metal and agriculture products). Secondly, it accounts for different levels of economic development and 
resources endowment that requires facilitating intra-regional trade amongst RECs (which may lead to 
output correlation (business cycle co-movement as bilateral trade deepens). Finally, it yields a large 
panel dataset that satisfies the precondition for factor modelling (Stock and Watson, 2002). 
Data on economic and financial series used are mainly sourced from the International Monetary 
Fund (which includes Direction of Trade Statistics, International Financial Statistics and the World 
Economic Outlook databases) and World Bank (mainly Global Financial Development, World 
Development Indicator and World Bank Open Data databases), as presented Table 6 in the Appendix. 
Where necessary, the time series are seasonally adjusted, and the nominal series are deflated using the 
consumers’ price index (based 2010=100) to obtain real variables. 
Given the need for variables to be stationary in the context of FAVAR models (see Bernanke et 
al., 2005), stationarity properties of the series were established using the DF-GLS unit root test proposed 
by Elliot et al. (1996) and the Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) unit root test with the null 
hypothesis of stationarity. We rely on the KPPS unit root test, in cases where the unit root t-statistics of 
the DF-GLS test are inconclusive. Optimal lag lengths are selected using the Schwarz information 
criterion (SIC) in order to remove serial correlation from the stochastic error term. The order of 
integration of each time-series is determined by applying the following transformations: level–no 
transformation (1), first difference (2), log-level (4) and log-first difference (5), as presented in Table 6 
in the Appendix..  
 
In this sub-section, we present and discuss the results of the FAVAR models as explained in 
section 4. Firstly, we analyse the evolution of real activities and short-term interest rate factors in each 
regional bloc from the principal components analysis. Next, we discuss the results of impulse response 
functions (IRF), especially the effects of real and monetary policy shocks to Nigeria and South African 
on African trading blocs.  Finally, we conducted counterfactual analysis to assess what would have 
                                                          
14
 In cases where quarterly data is unavailable, a linear interpolation method is used to obtain quarterly series 
from annual timeseries.  
15
 It is worth mentioning that the inclusion of Kenya in CEMAC regional bloc is due to the exclusion of countries 
belonging to Eastern Africa Communities, however, trade ties between the CEMAC countries and Kenya is 
relatively strong. Also, there is no qualitative difference between the results obtained with and without  Kenya as 
part of CEMAC. 
16
 Calculation is based on 2016 estimates from World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database. 
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happened to the real activity and interest rates of the three trading blocs in the absence of shocks from 
the two leading economies.  
 
  
5.2.1 Common components of real activity and interest rates.  
Fig.1 plots the estimated principal components (common factors) of real activity and interest 
rates in the focal regional blocs. The behaviour of the real activity factors displayed coincide with some 
major global events, supporting the growing integration of Africa into the world economy and the 
ensuing large exposure to external (global) shocks as increasing trade and financial linkages drive 
regional economic integrations. A few patterns are apparent. For instance, all the regional blocs 
experienced, on average, five severe recessions in the 1980s; between 1991 and 1993; from 2001 to 
2002; between 2009 to 2011; and 2015. These periods coincide with, among others: protracted 
recessions of the 1980s associated with tight monetary and austerity measures (and macroeconomic 
economic difficulties) in the advanced countries (1997-1998); the adoption of prescribed radical 
economic and fiscal reforms by the International Monetary Funds (IMF)17; the synchronized global 
economic downturn linked to the burst of the dot.com bubble, the global economic and financial crisis 
between 2007 and 2012 associated with the sub-prime crisis in the US which triggered a tight global 
financial condition/ financial contagion (debt crisis) in the Euro area; the sudden fall in commodity 
prices. Other developments were the economic rebalancing in the US and China (which are also Africa’s 
major trading partners) which say the gradual increase in the US interest rates and the slowdown in 
China’s real GDP to rebalance its economy18.  
Furthermore, the impressive economic performance observed in all the regional blocs between 
2003 and 2008 coincides with the commodity price super-cycle largely driven by China’s insatiable 
demand for commodities to support its export-led production model (see, Farooki et al. 2010 and Gauvin 
and Rebilard, 2018). The sharp fall in economic activities in the regional blocs in 2007/8 can be 
associated with the fall in global commodity prices, currency depreciation and crashes of stock 
exchanges due to the tight financial conditions the global recession created, and liquidity dry-up in the 
global capital markets. The subsequent recovery in economic activity levels in all the three regional 
blocs in 2010, despite the advanced economies experiencing a synchronised economic downturn in the 
same period, can be linked to the counter-fiscal measures adopted in most of the Africa countries. 
Finally, a closer look at Fig.1 reveals a distinct co-movement, most notably in SADC and 
CEMAC, of the regional common component of interest rates characterized by a gradual rise in the 
1980s and peaking in the 90s before declining steadily to its lowest value in 2014. These trends match 
the persistent inflationary episodes of the 80s, subsequent deflationary period associated with the 
adoption of radical economic reforms in Africa in the 90s and the great moderation period (1993–2007) 
of low global inflation, economic stability and structural decline in the volatility of business cycles (see, 
Kose et al.2012 and Hirata et al.2013). Furthermore, the steady rise in the short-term interest rate in 
ECOWAS in the aftermath of the recent global crisis is unsurprising given that the region consists 
mostly of oil producers facing sharp fall in commodity prices and dwindling foreign export revenue 
(IMF, 2015).  
  
                                                          
17
 See, e.g., UNCTAD (2001) and Camdessus (2000).  
18
 See, e.g. Feldkircher et al. (2016) for the global effects of the adopted gradual rise in the US’ interest rates, and 
Cashin et al.2017 for the policy-driven gradual slowdown in China’s real GDP, in the aftermath of the recent 
global crisis. See, for example, Chen and Nord (2016) and IMF (2015) for similar study on the SSA region. 
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SADC Real Activity SADC Short-term Interest rate 
 
 
  
ECOWAS Real Activity ECOWAS Short-term Interest rate 
 
 
  
CEMAC Real Activity CEMAC Short-term Interest rate. 
  
Fig.1. Identified common factors using principal component analysis. 
Note: The factors (or common components) are computed using the dataset spanning 1980Q–2015Q1.  
 
 
5.2.2 Impulse response functions of Nigeria and South Africa on regional growths   
We begin our analysis by considering first the effects of a positive shock to the Nigerian real 
GDP on real activities of ECOWAS, SADC and CEMAC, presented in Fig.2. The results are obtained 
from the sign restriction identification discussed in section 4. It is observed that the shock leads to a 
long-lived and statistically significant increase in economic activities in ECOWAS and SADC but 
exerts no influence on CEMAC. Specifically, economic activity in ECOWAS reacts 
contemporaneously to the positive Nigerian growth shock expanding by almost 1.4% on impact. The 
expansionary effect of the Nigerian growth shock on economic activity in ECOWAS bloc is sizeable, 
highly significant and long-lived (up to 13th quarters) after impact, over most of the IRFs horizon.  
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Fig.2. Impulse response function on the effects of a positive shock to Nigerian real GDP on the economic 
activities of focal regional blocs. 
 
The considerable effect of growth spillover from Nigeria to ECOWAS bloc is unsurprising given 
the existence of strong economic linkages underpinned by direct intra-regional trade and indirect cross-
border trade channels, which are potential transmission mechanisms for spillover (IMF, 2012:25). 
Nigeria is a key export market for manufacturing goods or agricultural goods from neighbouring 
countries such as Niger, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire and Benin (see, World Bank, 2016; IMF, 2012), as 
previously mentioned.  In particular, exports to Nigeria is considerably large for Niger (6.3% of GDP), 
Togo (3.8%of GDP), Côte d’Ivoire (3.3% of GDP), and Benin (1.7% of GDP). Furthermore, Nigeria is 
the major source of petroleum products for Equatorial Guinea (11.9% of GDP), Côte d’Ivoire (7.5% of 
GDP), Ghana (4.6% of GDP), and Cameroon (4.2% of GDP) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(17.5% of GDP).  Given the existing strong trade links, it is plausible that a slowdown in Nigeria’s real 
GDP would adversely affect intra-regional trade (especially exports from ECOWAS countries) and 
economic performance of trade partners in the region owed to the subsequent fall in import demand and 
production of export (i.e., agricultural and manufacturing) goods, in the former.  
Also, Nigeria’s subsidy on the price of some fuel products (e.g., kerosene and gasoline) together 
with porous border have facilitate a strong cross-border informal trade ties in the West Africa region, 
which account for nearly 20% of Nigeria’s GDP and also unrecorded in the official statistic (World 
Bank, 2016; Afrika and Ajumbo 2012). This indirect (informal) trade channel enables the importation 
of sizable fuel and agricultural products to some ECOWAS members, most notably Benin, Cameroon, 
Chad and Niger (Golub, 2012a,b). Consequently, changes in the global oil price that affect Nigeria’s 
pricing policies for fuel products would significant spillovers on the domestic economies of these 
neighbouring countries,  directly or indirectly through the existing cross-border trade links.  
The empirical results also show the Nigerian growth shock exerts a positive effect on economic 
activity in SADC with an increase of about 0.6%, on average. However, the transmission of the shock 
in the SADC bloc is delayed by almost four quarters, while the induced expansionary effect of the shock 
on economic activity in SADC is long-lived and statistically significant for about ten quarters (i.e., 
between 5th and 15th quarters) after impact. Overall, these findings are consistent with economic 
convention given the existing strong trade and financial ties between Nigeria and South Africa, which 
is the dominant economic leader in the SADC region. For instance, the total value of bilateral trade 
between the two large countries amounted to $32.4 billion in 2018. In addition, between, 2002 and 
2012, South African imports from Nigeria grew by 750%, characterised mostly by the increase in oil 
imports, whereas Nigerian imports from South Africa surged by 130% during the same period 
(Freemantle, 2013). 
Lastly, we find evidence for a negligible influence of the Nigerian growth shocks on CEMAC, 
which can partly be attributed to  geographical distance of countries belonging to this regional bloc 
from Nigeria, high transportation costs, as well as tariffs levied on goods from countries outside the 
existing regional blocs that pose significant barriers to intra-regional trade in the continent (see, Arizala 
et al.2019; Fofack 2018; ECA, 2015, 2016) 
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Fig.3 displays the effects of a positive shock to a South African real GDP on economic activities 
of the three regional blocs. Generally, this shock considerably raises economic activities in all the focal 
regional blocs, with the positive effects being long-lived for most of the IRF horizon, but with varied 
specificities. As expected, the positive South African real GDP shock immediately raises economic 
activity in SADC by approximately 0.015% on impact. In general, the effect of the shock on SADC 
economic activity is large and statistically significant for most of the IRFs horizon (up to 18 quarters), 
after impact. The same applies to the expansionary effects of growth shocks from South Africa on real 
activities in the other two regional blocs, with the impact of the shock being much longer in CEMAC 
than ECOWAS, and lasting up to about 12 quarters (from 1st to 13 quarters)  and 8 quarters (between 
2nd to 10th quarter) after impact, respectively.  
 
 
Fig.3. Impulse response function on the effects of a positive shock to South African real GDP on the 
economic activities of focal regional blocs 
 
While the influence of South Africa on the SADC region is well documented. For example, 
Bonga-Bonga and Mabe (2019) show that South Africa continuously drives SADC factors except 
during the latest 2007/08 global crisis, a fact that can be attributed to the deep integration of South 
Africa into the global economy, while other SADC countries are less integrated19.  On the other hand, 
the influence of South Africa on economic activity in ECOWAS bloc is plausible given its strong ties 
to Nigeria, the hegemony in the region and growing cross-border investment between the two countries. 
As of 2018, more than 120 South African companies (which includes MTN, Shoprite, MultiChoice, 
South African Airways and Game) operated in Nigeria. The South Africa-Nigeria strategic partnership 
is further reinforced by the dual-listing of companies in the domestic stock exchanges of the two 
countries. For instance, Oando, an energy conglomerate based in Lagos, is listed in South Africa’s 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). Similarly, South African companies have made great strides in 
the Nigerian market, evidenced by the recent listing of MTN (a giant telecom South African company 
widely recognised as Africa's leading telecoms group) on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE).  
5.2.3 Effects of monetary policy shocks from Nigeria and South Africa on 
interest rates movement at the sub-regional level. 
Next, we assess whether the regional influence of the two large economies also extends to the 
financial channel.Based on the sign  restriction, monetary policy shocks are identified by assuming an 
increase in interest rate in the trading blocs from contractionary monetary policy shocks in Nigeria and 
South Africa.. Figs. 4 and 5 gives the IRF results of the transmission of monetary shocks from South 
Africa and Nigeria on the three regional blocs, respectively.  
                                                          
19
 See, also Basdevant et al.(2015) and World Bank (2016) for similar argument on the rapid re-integration of 
South Africa into the world economy compared to many SSA countries in the mid-1990s, in support of their 
findings on the negligible influence of  South Africa on economic growth of the rest of Africa and its neighbouring 
countries.  
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Fig.4 clearly shows that a positive shock to the South African interest rate raises interest rates in 
the three regional blocs, but with varied impacts. The interest rate in the SADC bloc reacts 
contemporaneously to the positive South African interest rate shock, rising by almost 2% on impact. 
Overall, the shock leads to a large, long-lived and statistically significant increase in interest rates (up 
to 14th quarters) in the SADC bloc, after impact. The effects of the shock on ECOWAS and CEMAC 
causes are positive but short lived.  
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Effects of monetary policy shock from the South African economy on regional blocs in SSA. 
 
 
Our finding on the significant impact of the South African monetary shock on SADC is 
predictable given its financial dominance in the regional bloc and growing financial interlinkages. For 
instance, countries such as Namibia, Lesotho and Eswatini are members of both the SADC and the 
Common Monetary Area (CMA) that links the four neighbouring countries to strong institutional, trade 
and investment ties in the Southern Africa region. Also, domestic currencies of the CMA countries are 
pegged to the rand (South Africa’s domestic currency) which is also a legal tender currency in these 
countries, directly exposing the CMA countries to monetary shocks emanating from South Africa20. In 
fact, a monetary policy change in South Africa could have a direct (and immediate) impact on economic 
activities in the CMA countries, indirectly affecting their neighbours (i.e., members of SADC and 
SACU) with close ties. The impact of the South African interest rate shock on the other regional blocs, 
that is, CEMAC and ECOWAS can be attributed to the growing financial links in the SSA region, 
largely driven by South Africa due to its advanced banking system and a high-capitalised stock 
exchange, which allows cross-border investments (especially outward foreign direct investment) as well 
as the increasing presence of South African banks (and local companies) in the SSA region (see, IMF, 
2012 and Carnales-Kriljenko, et al.2013; Arizala, 2019)21  
Fig.5 presents the results of the effects of the Nigerian monetary policy shocks on the three 
trading blocs. As anticipated, this shock immediately raises interest rate in ECOWAS bloc.. The effect 
of the positive shock to the Nigerian interest rate on ECOWAS is pronounced, long-lived and 
statistically significant (up to 8th quarters from impact) for most of the horizon. In contrast, the effect of 
the shock on the other regional blocs appears to be positive but mostly statistically insignificant. The 
results are not surprising, although one would expect the increase in cross-border expansion of Nigeria-
based banks in the SSA region to be a suitable channel for financial shocks transmission in the region. 
                                                          
20For detailed discussion on South Africa’s financial links in the SSA region, see, e.g., Arizala et al. (2019) and 
World Bank (2016). For example, South Africa is the largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) for 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland, by accounting for roughly 80% of total inward FDI (World Bank, 
2016). The direct investment ties between South Africa and some members of the SADC which includes Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe, are potential conduits for financial contagion (IMF, 2012:33). 
21
 South African large companies (e.g. MTN, Massmart and Nampak) have a strong presence in the SADC region 
(Mozambique, Zimbabwe), West Africa (Nigeria, Ghana) and the East African Community (Kenya, Uganda, and 
Tanzania). South Africa-based banks (Standard Bank, First Rand Bank, Nedbank) and other financial institutions 
are active across the continent (World Bank, 2016).  
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The Nigerian banks operate in more than 20 countries although the number of subsidiaries of these 
banks in SADC and CEMAC are quite few as compared to a large number of subsidiaries in ECOWAS.  
These findings suggest that Nigeria’s influence in the SSA region is limited to the trade channel 
only (real economic activities) which is supported by its abundant natural resources (particularly crude 
oil). However, the country exhibits relatively limited financial impacts given its weak financial 
system22.  However,  South Africa that plays an important role in the transmission of both growth 
spillovers and financial (monetary) shocks which are attributable to the country being a major exporter 
of precious metals, largest recipient of foreign capital (including private equity flow) and having the 
most extensive stock market capitalisation in Africa (Farid, 2013). Our results on the evidence of real 
economic activities and financial influences of South Africa on SADC bloc is consistent with Carnales-
Kirljenko et al. (2013) who observe substantial spillover from SA to the BLNS countries reflecting 
sizeable real and financial interlinkages. Also, our findings are similar to Arizala et al. (2019), who find 
South Africa as the main driving force behind intra-regional spillovers, being the largest economy in 
the SSA region and with the largest share of regional trade.   
 
 
Fig.5. Effects of monetary policy shocks from the Nigerian economy on regional blocs 
 
These results are robust with the change of the identification of shocks, for example by letting 
free the influence of interest rate shocks to Nigeria on the three trading blocs.  
 
5.2.4 Counterfactual analysis  
 
So far, the empirical results reveal that growth spillovers originating from Nigeria and South 
Africa significantly affect economic activities at the sub-regional level. Additionally, anecdotal 
evidence from the analysed intra-Africa trade in section 3, shows that Nigeria and South Africa are key 
drivers of trade in their respective regional blocs with South Africa accounting for nearly 29% to 32% 
of total intra-African trade, and Nigeria accounted for about 6.5% to 7.1%, between 2014 and 2017 
(see, Table 1), while accounting for almost 24% and 5.51% respectively, in 2018 (Woofrey, et al.2019). 
Interpretatively, one would expect these large economies might wield considerable regional influence 
as main drivers of regional growth and intra-regional trade. Therefore, a key question is, how economic 
activities in SADC and ECOWAS would have fared with or without growth shocks from South Africa 
and Nigeria, respectively. To answer this question, we conduct a counterfactual analysis to assess what 
would the dynamics of economic activities be in SADC and ECOWAS without shocks from South 
Africa and Nigeria, respectively.    
 
 
Figure 6 shows the levels of  actual economic activities in the SADC region represented in solid 
line and the counterfactual economic activity of the region, in the absence of South African GDP  
                                                          
22In 2011, as a percentage of GDP, market capitalisation of Nigeria (17%) is much lower than South Africa (210%) 
with the value of total traded equities (in domestic stock exchanges) of about 1.8% and 91.2%, respectively (IMF, 
2012:34)  
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shocks, represented in dashed line  in panel A. It is clear from Figure 6 the South African real shocks 
have driven the path of economic activities in the SADC region,  with their positive contributions being 
apparent during most of the periods (see Panel B).  However, the results displayed in Figure 6 show 
that the contribution of the South African shocks to the SADC region becomes negative during 
important global crises, such as the 2000 Dot com crisis, the 2001 and 2002 Latin American economic 
crisis,  the 2008-2009 global financial crisis,  the 2014 Russian crisis and the 2015 Indian crisis (see 
Bonga-Bonga, 2018 for a detailed explanation the these crises). The  negative contribution of the South 
African economy to the SADC region during periods of economic and global crises is due to the 
integration of South Africa to the global economy. literature abounds on the extent of the integration of 
the  South African economy to the global economy (see Bonga-Bonga and Mabe, 2019) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Fig.6 Actual and counterfactual level of economic activities in the SADC bloc. 
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Fig.7. Contribution of the Nigerian GDP shocks to ECOWAS bloc’s real activity. 
 
 
 
Figure 7 displays the contribution of the Nigerian real GDP shocks to ECOWAS real activity. 
like in the case of South Africa, GDP shocks to Nigeria have negative contribution during the 2008-
2009 global crisis and the 2014 period, causing a sharp contraction in economic activity in the region, 
which can be associated with a sharp drop of global oil prices since Nigeria depends heavily on crude 
oil exports. Between June and December 2014, the Brent price of crude oil dropped by 44%, resulting 
in one of the most dramatic declines in the price of oil in recent history23.  
 
Taken together, the noticeable influence of Nigeria and South Africa on the economic activities 
in ECOWAS and SADC respectively, especially during important global crises such as the recent 
2007/08 global recession, reinforces their important role as growth drivers at the sub-regional level24. 
Overall, the results of the counterfactual simulations are indicative that economic conditions in these 
large countries can affect sub-regional growths and play a crucial role in shaping the business cycles of 
regional blocs. Meanwhile, the influence of the two large economies appeared to be intricately linked 
changes in global commodity prices (i.e., oil prices for Nigeria and precious metals for South Africa).  
 
 
 
6. Conclusion.  
The realization that regional economic integration is important in fostering business cycle 
convergence,  enhancing the resilience of a region against external shocks and boosting intra-regional 
trade, has rekindled the institutional willingness and political support in Africa for the establishment of 
large free trade agreements such as the TFTA and, most recently the AfCFTA. Nonetheless, the 
dominance of large resource-rich hegemonic economies, most notably Nigeria and South Africa, with 
extensive trade and financial linkages, exposes other Africa countries to intra-regional spillovers. 
However, this strand of empirical analysis remains largely unstudied, as extant studies are mostly 
devoted to investigating the implications of external (global) shocks.  
                                                          
23As robust global production exceeded demand, crude oil prices fell sharply in 2014:Q4. After reaching monthly 
peaks of $112 per barrel (bbl) and $105/bbl in June, crude oil benchmarks Brent and West Texas Intermediate 
(WTI) fell to $62/bbl and $59/bbl in December, respectively (U.S, Energy Information Agency, 2019).  Retrieved 
from https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=19451 
24This inference lend credence to Fall et al.(2014), who find evidence for a positive correlation between intra-
regional trade and economic growth in both Nigeria and South Africa, to conclude that growth of these economic 
leaders reinforces regional trade, in an estimated panel model (with a fixed effect) for the period 1995 – 2010. 
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This paper contributes to the extant literature by investigating the effects of notable intra-regional 
spillovers, that is, real growth and monetary shocks emanating from Nigeria and South Africa, on the 
real economic activity ( mainly the trade channel) and interest rates (financial channel) of three regional 
blocs: CEMAC, SADC and ECOWAS encompassing 26 countries over the period 1980Q1 to 2015Q4, 
employing a two-step FAVAR modelling procedure and large panel data of 412 variables covering the 
real, nominal and financial sectors. We also consider the influence wielded by these large economies 
on the fluctuations of (real) economic activities in their respective regional blocs (i.e., ECOWAS and 
SADC) by decomposing the historical real activities of the blocs in order  to distinguish between their 
actual and counterfactual levels.. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first attempt to consider 
the implications of intra-regional spillovers associated with growth and monetary shocks from Nigeria 
and South Africa to the three blocs.  
Broadly speaking, our empirical results are consistent with economic theory but contradict those 
documented in the extant literature, as we find both Nigeria and South Africa to be important growth 
drivers for other countries in their respective regions and also potential sources of intra-regional 
spillovers in SSA region, with South Africa playing a more prominent role.  
Our results can be summarized in three-fold: Firstly, we find large (and statistically) significant 
effects of the growth shocks transmitted from Nigeria and South Africa to their ‘own’ and each other’s 
regional blocs underpinned by strong trade ties between these economic leaders. Unlike Nigeria, growth 
spillovers from South Africa have significant short-run (and statistically significant) positive impact on 
economic activity in CEMAC bloc.  In addition, we empirically show that South Africa and Nigeria 
play important roles as drivers of intra-regional trade and regional growth. Secondly, our counterfactual 
simulations suggest a considerable contribution of growth shocks from Nigeria and South Africa on the 
fluctuations of real activities in their respective regional blocs, with larger negative impacts occurring 
during unfavourable global economic and financial conditions.  . Finally, our results on the transmission 
of monetary policy shocks from the two large economies via the interest rate channel show a long-
lasting, highly significant and more pronounced impact on the movement of (short-term) interest rates 
in their respective regional blocs. But, the financial influence of South Africa extends beyond SADC 
bloc to the other blocs, namely CEMAC and ECOWAS, while that of Nigeria is limited to ECOWAS 
only.   
On the policy front, based on our findings, it is important that policymakers in Africa closely pay 
attention to the economic development in South Africa and Nigeria given their hegemonic role as 
regional growth drivers as well as the increasing financial links (mostly via cross-border investments) 
at the sub-regional levels.  Also, since economic conditions and monetary policy in these large resource-
rich economies affect regional growth, it is imperative for policymakers to intensive their efforts on 
promoting co-ordinated macroeconomic and monetary policy changes at regional level to drive regional 
economic integration, promote an inclusive regional development and ameliorate the severity of 
external (global) and internal (intra-regional) shocks. In this context, policymakers in Africa need to 
understand the different sources and transmission channels as well as the magnitude of intra-regional 
spillovers.  In addition, policymakers should amplify the transmission of positive externalities (trade 
gains) associated with deepening intra-African trade by facilitating initiatives to: (i) encourage 
economic diversification to reduce over-dependence on few commodities for export), (ii)  lower the 
tariffs on imported goods and services from countries that belong to other regional blocs, and (iii) 
increase investment in infrastructure and intra-regional transportation networks to enhance facilitate 
flow of goods and services across the SSA.   
In a future study, we intend to build on the empirical work in this paper to investigate the 
asymmetric effects of growth shocks from both Nigeria and South Africa on the other African 
economies. A typical analysis would shed more light on whether the impact of an intra-regional positive 
shock from large African economies, such as Nigeria and South Africa, outweigh the spillover effect of 
a negative shock with similar magnitude. It would also be useful to extend the ‘spillover analysis’ to 
other recognized five RECs to grasp the extent of the influence of the two large economies beyond their 
respective regions.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Fig.9: Share of total regional trade as a percentage of world trade. 
Source: IMF’s DOTS database (2019). Own illustration. 
Note: AEs = Advanced Economies; EM&DC = Emerging Market and Developing Countries; CIS = 
Commonwealth of Independent States; EU = European Union; EM & DEV.EU = Emerging & Developing 
Europe; MENAP = Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; WH= 
Western Hemisphere. 
 
Table 4: Countries and regional blocs in the FAVAR model 
Core Countries   ECOWAS  SADC  
†Nigeria1   Benin2  †Angola1 
‡South Africa1   ‡Burkina Faso2  Botswana1 
 
 Côte d'Ivoire  †Congo, Dem Rep. of2  
  Gambia2  Eswatini1 
CEMAC  ‡Ghana1  Lesotho1 
†Cameroon1   ‡Guinea  Malawi2 
†Chad2   ‡Niger3  Mauritius1 
‡Congo, Republic of1   ‡Sierra-Leone3  Mozambique2 
Kenya1   ‡Togo3  ‡Namibia1 
    Tanzania3 
   
 ‡Zambia1  
Note: †Net oil exporters; ‡Other commodity exporters (e.g. precious metals and agricultural products)   
1Middle-income countries; 2Low-income countries; and 3Fragile countries.
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Table 5: Country size (in GDP), PPP-GDP and World rankings. 
GDP Rankings, 2016  2016 PPP-GDP 
World Ranking Country  (US$, millions) World Ranking Country  
Millions, 
international 
US$ 
26 Nigeria 405,083 21 Nigeria 1,092,218 
38 South Africa 294,841 29 South Africa 740,661 
62 Angola 89,633 63 Angola 186,327 
68 Kenya 70,529 72 Kenya 153,199 
81 Tanzania 47,431 73 Tanzania 150,607 
85 Ghana 42,690 77 Ghana 121,311 
91 Côte d'Ivoire 36,165 82 Côte d'Ivoire 87,689 
92 Congo, DR 34,999 86 Cameroon 84,765 
100 Cameroon 24,204 94 Zambia 65,382 
108 Zambia 19,551 99 Congo, DR 63,289 
114 Botswana 15,275 111 Botswana 38,231 
118 Mali 14,045 116 Mozambique 35,148 
122 Mauritius 12,164 120 Burkina Faso 33,087 
123 Burkina Faso 12,115 125 Congo, Rep. 29,363 
127 Mozambique 11,015 126 Chad 28,827 
131 Namibia 10,267 128 Mauritius 26,714 
134 Chad 9,601 129 Namibia 26,398 
137 Benin 8,583 133 Guinea 24,422 
140 Congo, Rep. 7,834 134 Benin 23,613 
141 Niger 7,509 138 Malawi 21,187 
148 Guinea 6,299 139 Niger 20,427 
151 Malawi 5,442 146 Togo 11,360 
155 Togo 4,400 147 Swaziland 11,209 
158 Swaziland 3,727 149 Sierra Leone 10,940 
159 Sierra Leone 3,669 156 Lesotho 6,516 
179 The Gambia, 965 161 The Gambia, 3,425 
Source: World Bank Database.  
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Table 6:  Data sources and Macroeconomic Variables 
No. Timeseries  Source *tcode  
Real Activity  
1 Real GDP, SA, Index, 2010=100 IFS 5 
2 Real GDP, Historical spliced, Exp. Approach, SA, Index, 2010=100 IFS 5 
3 Final Household Consumption Expenditure, SA, Index,2010=100 IFS 5 & 4 
4 Adjusted National Income, SA  WBOD 4 & 5 
5 Real Gross Domestic Income (constant LCU), SA, Index, 2010=100 WDI 5 
6 Real Gross National Income (current US$) SA Index, 2010=100 GFDD 5 
7 
Gross Fixed Investment (gross capital formation plus the change in 
Inventories), SA, Index,2010=100   5 
8 Gross Fixed Capital Formation  IFS 5 
9 Gross Savings (% of gross domestic product) WDI 1, 2 & 5 
10 Gross Savings (% of gross national income) WDI 1 or   2 
11 Gross Capital Formation, SA IFS 5 
12 Import, CIF, SA DOTS 5 
13 Export, FOB, SA.  DOTS 5 
14 Export value index, 2000=100, SA  WDI 5 
15 Import value Index, 2000=100, SA  WDI 5 
16 Export, volume of goods & services, (% change) SA WEO 1 
17 Import Volume of goods & services, (% change), SA WEO 1 
18 Industrial Production Index, 2010=100 IFS 5 
19 Total Investment (% of GDP) WEO  4 & 5 
 Interest rates 
20 Deposits (%) IFS 1 
21 Money market (%) IFS 1 
22 3-Months Treasury Bills (%) IFS 1 
23 Discount rates (%) IFS 1 
24 Monetary policy related rates (%) IFS 1 
25 Repo rates  IFS 1 
26 Real Interest rates (%) WDI 1 & 2 
Note: GFDD= Global Financial Development Database (World Bank); IFS= International Financial Statistics 
(IMF), DOTS= Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF), WDI= World Development Indicator (World Bank), WEO= 
World Economic Outlook (2019, October) database (IMF), WBOD= World Bank Open Data.  
*tcode=Transformation code for stationarity: 1= level, 2= log level, 4= first difference and 5= log difference.  
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